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Prices are related to supply and demand. At a time when demand for TVs exceeded supply, local governments piled into the sector that had an artificially low market entry barrier, and then used a high degree of protection to ensure captive markets for local products and prevent unprofitable firms under their jurisdictions from being acquired. Then, overcapacity occurred as a result of duplicate economic activity at many Chinese firms that were set up just for the sake of creating employment for excess labour 11 . Moreover, China's TV manufacturers do not possess core technologies in very large-scale integrated circuits, tubes, displays, etc.
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In early 2002, China-made DVD players were impounded by customs in several European countries with the charge that their manufacturers had not paid for the patents used. Later, Philips, Sony and Pioneer waged a legal battle in the European Union court, pressuring Chinese DVD player manufacturers to pay royalties for the technologies. Initially, payment was requested at US$20 per DVD machine, which the Chinese side claimed to be too high, given the sales price of a player being only US$90 12 . Through negotiation, these firms settled by agreeing to pay Philips, Sony and Pioneer US$5. They also later reached agreements with other foreign companies on royalty payments: 4% of the sales price or US$4, whichever is higher, for each player to NEC, Panasonic, Toshiba, JVC, Mitsubishi and Time Warner, US$10 to DTS, US$4.95 to Dolby Laboratories, and US $2.5 to MPEG LA. Most recently, Thompson, the partner of TCL, requested a payment of US$1 or US$1.5, depending upon where the player is sold, China or abroad. With the number of DVD players made in China in 2003 being at least 50 million, the total payment amount was huge 13 . 9 Such incidents have been typical of the Chinese industry in the past decade. Multinational corporations (MNCs) have gradually moved the production of consumer electronics products from the United States and Japan to Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then to China and other countries with low labour costs; but they use critical technology patents as leverages and also focus on developing next-generation products or technology embodied in the existing products. China was supposed to have thus absorbed and assimilated such technology and to have gradually developed indigenous products and climbed the ladder of technological learning. Unfortunately, this has not happened; and therefore, located downstream of the global value chain, China has no choice but to continue to pay for the use of foreign technology. In the meantime, the homogenisation and commoditisation of these products have inevitably dragged Chinese firms into price competition. As such, their earning power has diminished significantly. TV manufacturer Changhong made the same profit from its sales of 6.94 million sets as Sony achieved through its sales of half a million sets 14 . 10 The phenomenon is not limited to the consumer electronics industry. Take Legend, China's largest PC manufacturer, as an example 15 . In 1998, it took over IBM to become the leader in China's PC market. But as Liu Chuanzhi, Legend's chairman, acknowledged, the company has merely played the role of a "mover" (banyungong) for foreign technology 16 . Similarly, having spent several billion dollars importing first-generation analog technology and second-generation global mobile communications (GSM) technology, China's mobile communications industry is still under the shadow of foreign technology. Although domestically manufactured mobile handsets held a market share of more than 50% in 2003, a dramatic increase from 5% in 2000, Motorola and Nokia have sold more phones to Chinese customers while many of those shipped by Bird, China's number one handset maker, are still sitting in warehouses or on store shelves 17 . Moreover, as few firms have devoted themselves to technological development, each and every mobile phone made in China contains critical components that have to be imported from abroad 18 . China's handset market has also been experiencing the familiar and disastrous price wars and the profit erosion 19 . And although the exact amount of money that China Unicom paid for Qualcomm's code division multiple access (CDMA) technology is unknown, it includes an entry fee, a software licence fee, and a fee linked to the number of subscribers or revenues. In addition, recently, Cisco Systems, the world's leading networking and communications manufacturer, accused China's switcher/router developer Huawei Technologies of patent infringement 20 . Foreseen areas of contention involving intellectual property rights in China include automobiles and digital TVs.
11 A high-tech industry is, loosely speaking, one in which its success depends largely on its ability to keep up with rapid innovations in products or production processes, or both 21 . Microelectronics, biotechnology, new materials, telecommunications, civilian aviation, robotics plus machine tools, and computers hardware and software are considered to be crucial to success amid current global competition 22 . Statistical classifications of hightech industry typically rely on such indicators as the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditures to sales, the share of scientists and engineers in the labour force, and so on. The US Bureau of Census has adopted a separate classification code, "advanced technology" for products meeting the following criteria: the underlined technology is from a recognised high technology field (e.g., biotechnology, information technology); the technology used is leading-edge in that field 23 .
12 In China, a firm is to register and to be certified as high-tech only if it falls into the abovementioned categories and meets the following requirements: at least 30% of its employees have college or higher level education, more than 5% of its sales is spent on R&D, and more than 60% of its sales is related to technology services and high-tech products 24 . High-tech in China's trade statistical reporting system until 1998 referred to computers and telecommunications, life science, aerospace and aeronautics, electronics, weapons, opto-electronics, computer integrated manufacturing, nuclear technology, could be obtained using data from the American source as well, with "office and computing machinery" and "communications equipment" gaining ground but still being far from the 0.5 reading, "drugs and medicines" suffering a dramatic loss, while "aerospace" experienced little change. 17 Here, I will use the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) method to further measure how competitive China's particular high-tech fields are in the world (Figure 3) . The "office and computing machinery" category had been the only high-tech sector in which China has gained significantly in the international markets recently, as indicated by a remarkable increase in its RCA from 0.076, a very low competitiveness reading, in 1980, to a strong trade competitiveness level of 1.30 in 1998. The RCA for "communications equipment" increased between 1980 and 1990 and declined thereafter, and the competitiveness of the "aerospace" industry had been improving, though not well. However, "drugs and medicines" witnessed its RCA erode significantly over the period in which comparable data are available-from a very competitive industry to one that was no longer competitive. 19 Second, the export-led high-tech industry has been based on low labour costs and imported foreign technologies or even components. China has become an important assembly line for products made using key high-tech parts from abroad with the addition of low-tech domestic components. The majority of Chinese exports are lower-end products involving basic processing and manufacturing techniques, while imports in general are much more sophisticated 31 . There has been a tendency among the world's leading MNCs, especially those in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, to move their manufacturing facilities, or outsource production, to China, which, unfortunately, is not due to the nation's competitiveness in technology, but largely its comparative advantage in labour 32 . China has moved and will move steadily upmarket and anything-high-or low-tech-that requires many parts to be assembled in an efficient manner at low cost will find an attractive production base in China, which, in the purest sense of the term, is globalisation at work 33 . Being labour-rather than technologyintensive, those so-called "high-tech" gadgets have a profit margin of sometimes as low as 2-3%. For example, Wanda, a wireless mouse manufactured by Logitech International SA, a Swiss-American company, sells in the United States for around US$40, of which China takes a meagre US$3 for wages, power, transport, and other overhead costs 34 . In a word, located at the lower end of the international division of labour, the nation has yet to achieve much in added-value and raise its competitive advantage significantly. This may also explain the discrepancy of trade statistics between the Chinese and American sources: products considered "high-tech" in China may not be elsewhere. 20 Third, in sectors where China is enjoying a certain level of competitiveness, much of it has come from foreign-invested enterprises (sanzi qiye). In 2000, for example, 92.5% of computer systems and 96.4% of mobile communications equipments were exported by foreign-invested enterprises 35 . In 2002, wholly-owned foreign enterprises contributed 55.4% of China's high-tech exports, while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have seen its portion declining year over year 36 . FDI to China is supposed to diffuse advanced technology to Chinese enterprises and make them technologically competitive; unfortunately, the high-tech exports statistics show a different picture. 21 The above analysis seems to indicate another reality about China's high-tech sector and industry: They have developed rapidly, but they are structurally risky-processing-and assembling-focused, low-end product-oriented and low value-added, and foreign-invested enterprise-led. China may make and export "high-tech" products in a large quantity, but may not enjoy higher added value as high-tech products are supposed to do, as a larger share of its companies' profits go to owners of core high technologies. The situation has not improved, and therefore the growth is probably unsustainable. To become a hightech power, China has to move beyond the advantage that it offers in terms of labour in order to gain a competitive edge in a "cluster" of technologies to enable it to climb the technology value chain. 22 Since the early 1980s, in an effort to explore the Chinese way of technology diffusion, new technology enterprises spun off from China's research institutes and universities have competed with MNCs. Many of them have been successful because of their strong connection with the institutions from which they were spun off-Legend with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Founder with Peking University, and so on. Although they were financially humble at their start, they had access to staff and facilities, and more importantly, could take advantage of research achievements made in these institutionsmainly the results of the state investment during the planned economy period 37 . 23 This strategy seems to have worked out well thus far. But further development of these technology enterprises is more unsure.
24 First, many of China's industrial firms have few financial resources to carry out innovative R&D activities. Large-and medium-sized enterprises have spent on average 0.5%-0.8% of their sales on R&D (Table 4) 38 . According to a survey, firms within high-tech parks spent an average 1.9% of their sales on R&D, far below the 5% standard by the Chinese definition of a high-tech firm, as noted above, while those outside the parks merely 0.63% 39 . As enterprises have been cautious in their R&D spending, a fair guess would be that the industry could not afford to spend money on technology 40 . 25 Second, is the lack of qualified personnel because of a severe "brain drain" of Chinese talent to foreign countries as well as to foreign-invested enterprises in China. In 2002, in large-and medium-sized SOEs, personnel involved in technological development accounted for 5% of the total employees, and only about one-quarter of them had technological development units, representing a steady decline since the 1990s 41 . As a result, even after acquiring designs from MNCs, SOEs still lack the depth of engineering expertise 42 .
26 Third, there is always the question of how this limited amount of resources is utilised. In pursuing quick profits, almost all the Chinese enterprises are keen to import foreign technology as the way to upgrade production technology, while in such purchases equipment dominates over software such as patents, know-how, blueprints, and so on. Between 1991 and 2002, a very limited amount of the spending on technology imports was used to obtain a technology licence, while 95% went on hardware. Large-and medium-sized enterprises spent more on technology importation than R&D until 1999 (see Table 1 ). And once the equipment is imported, almost no financial resources are given to absorption, assimilation and innovation 43 , thus resulting in a vicious cycle of "importing, lagging behind, importing again, and lagging behind again".
27 Fourth, enterprises also lack interest in engaging domestic institutions of learning for R&D efforts. The reform of the science and technology system since the mid-1980s has to some extent activated the enthusiasm of researchers in these institutions (the supply side of technology), but enterprises (the demand side) have been reluctant to acquire 29 As a result, a yawning gap remains between the finest corporations in China and the world. The nation has yet to come up with a China-created product as Japan in the early 1970s or South Korea in the 1990s 51 , and not one of China's largest SOEs, or "national teams" as they are referred to, have become a globally competitive giant with a global market, a global brand, and a global procurement system 52 . These seem to be a bitter assessment of the Chinese industry's situation, but it is fair. 30 Entry to the WTO has brought more challenges and fiercer competition and Chinese firms are facing a crisis. The phasing out of many tariffs means the gradually eroded price advantage of domestic products and the domination of technology, quality and cost, rather than price in competition. Without access to updated technology and managerial know-how, the Chinese firms may lose their battle with their foreign competitors. In the meantime, MNCs have expanded their presence in China opening independent R&D centres and collaborating with Chinese researchers. This is part of the global development strategy of the parent companies-being close to their Chinese operations and localising technology developed in the "home base"-so that their contribution to China's R&D should not be exaggerated. But it is possible for MNCs to tap the high-quality researchers, even from domestic enterprises, so as to strengthen their position beyond the advantage of cheap labour in their production in China 53 . Under these circumstances, it is a matter of ultimate responsibility and survival, not choice, for China's domestic enterprises to upgrade their technologies and products on their own. In this regard, the Chinese government has also tried its best to stimulate innovation and provide policy guidance. 31 In 2000, enterprise spending in China's R&D exceeded 60% for the first time, implying that enterprises have become more important in research and innovation. A study of all high-tech firms in the Haidian district of Peking where the Zhongguancun Science Park is located finds that current sales revenue of the firm provides an important driving force for private R&D expenditure 54 . Between 2000 and 2003, the top 100 domestic electronics and information enterprises spent on average some 3% of annual sales revenue on R&D (the number is not satisfying but promising), with telecoms equipment manufacturers Huawei Technologies, Datang Telecommunications, and Zhongxing Telecommunications leading the way, each devoting about 10% of the sales revenue to R&D, well-qualified as high-tech firms even by international standards 55 . Nationwide, of the more than 10 million medium-and small-sized firms, 150,000 allocate more than 5% of sales to technological development 56 . 58 . Legend, Founder, Chunlan, among others, have central research academies oriented towards developing process and product technologies and long-term technology strategies. Several Chinese corporations have also set up R&D centres abroad as they expand internationally 59 .
33 Huawei is a case of point. Founded in 1988, it mandated in its charter to devote 10% of its sales revenue to R&D, and increase the expenditure if necessary. Forty percent of the company's employees are engaged in R&D, and the company is also involved in exploratory research 60 . In 2002, Huawei achieved a sales revenue of 17.2 billion yuan, of which 3 billion yuan (or 17.8%) were spent on R&D. The company now owns 686 patented technologies with 85% being invention patents, and its intelligence network won China's Scientific and Technological Progress Award in 2002, a rare but impressive achievement 61 . 34 The government has also aimed to stimulate the building-up of an indigenous technological capability in industry. The 1997 National Conference on Technological Innovation promoted the role of enterprises in the nation's R&D activities. Immediately following the conference, the then State Economic and Trade Commission selected Baoshan Iron and Steel, Changhong, Jiangnan Shipbuilding, Northern China Pharmaceuticals (all SOEs), Hai'er (a collective), and Founder (a university spin-off) to experiment in technological innovation 62 . At the 1999 National Conference on Technological Innovation, the government further demanded that high-tech enterprises spend at least 5% of their annual sales on R&D 63 . The most recent policy measures include allowing R&D expenditure to be counted as cost, implementing a technology standardand patent-focused strategy in enterprise innovation endeavours, and supporting software products "Made in China" in government procurements 64 .
35 In the information and communications technology (ICT) sectors, emphasis has been on developing China's semiconductor industry. Firms have been encouraged to develop central processing units (CPUs) used in certain consumer electronics products and mobile phone handsets. Attention has also been paid to design application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) used in ICT, a sector with advanced technological sophistication, wider usability as well as higher added value. China's computer industry has campaigned for the introduction and use of the open-source Linux operating system and related application software packages. Due to the government mandate, the Linux-based operating system and office applications developed by Chinese software companies have eroded Microsoft's dominance in software procurement, which signals not only the sensitivity, given the size of the procurement and strategic importance, but also the viability for these companies 65 . Under these circumstances, Microsoft was put on the defensive and agreed to invest 6.2 billion yuan to help develop China's software industry and China's e-government initiative 66 .
36 One of the high-profile technology policy measures is the so-called "technology standards" strategy by which China intends to formulate its own standards that leverage its large market in international competition 67 . China's participation in worldwide 3G wireless communications standard setting is one such example.
37 China's telecoms equipment manufacturing sector was among the first to open to global competition as well as the sector where domestic players have attained critical mass. China began its massive telecoms equipment manufacturing industry in the early 1980s. Initially, technology transfers through direct imports and Sino-foreign joint ventures played an important role. Through absorbing and assimilating foreign technology and most importantly indigenous R&D efforts, Chinese firms, represented by Great Dragon, Datang, Zhongxing and Huawei ("JuDaZhongHua" according to the first characters of the firms' Chinese names), have gradually acquired advanced technology and accumulated technology capability to develop their own products. These firms employ a higher percentage of scientists and engineers with masters and doctorate degrees, and invest 10% or more of their sales revenue in R&D 68 . They may still lack critical technology such as ASICs, and could acquire them through participating in the international division of labour-outsourcing those to foreign firms 69 ; they are not in the same league with the world's big players either in size, technology, quality, or performance of the equipment, because most of the manufacturers are technology followers rather than innovators; and by the time they reverse-engineer the imported products and develop the manufacturing capability to imitate them, their international competitors will have introduced a successive generation. Nevertheless, because of their presence, foreign firms have to bow out of the low-end product market, or reduce prices for similar products sold in China. Domestic suppliers accounted for 43% of the stored programme-controlled central office switches in 2000 from none in 1982 (the statistics from another angle show why China's international competitiveness in communications exports increased as discussed above) 70 .
38 Therefore, as China is, along with other countries moving towards the 3G, it offers a domestically proposed and the International Telecommunications Union-approved standard-TD-SCDMA, jointly developed by China's Datang and Germany's Siemens-to compete with the cdma2000 standard by the US mobile network developer Qualcomm, the owner of key patents behind the code division multiple access (CDMA) standard, and the wideband CDMA (WCDMA) standard, also known as universal mobile telecommunications service (UMTS), from Europe. The Chinese government also allocated more radio spectrum to the home-grown TD-SCDMA standard than to its competitors-WCDMA and CDMA2000. Although the Chinese standard may not be as advanced as the other two standards and it may be premature to suggest that one of China's mobile operators would adopt the standard, the case itself-which may be labelled technonationalist-at least suggests that China's technical community has realised the importance of independent intellectual property rights and devoted its innovative 40 Japan, Taiwan and South Korea all experienced the lag between technology importation and indigenous innovation. For example, when South Korea started heavy-and-chemicalindustry-led industrialisation in the 1960s, it chose to import foreign technology. Later on, through establishing the enterprise as the important player in the national innovation system and providing policy guidance, the country has seen endogenous innovation-driven development 71 . Korean firms have gradually moved from original equipment manufacturing (OEM) to own design manufacturing (ODM) and own brand manufacturing (OBM) so as to garnish much added value 72 . One would expect China to develop along the same trajectory. 41 In the meantime, the experiences of Asia's newly industrialised economies also suggest that it is not technology importation, but rather the lack of local absorptive capacity to assimilate, adapt, and improve imported technology, that leads to dependency on foreign technology; and heavy reliance on FDI as a means of technology transfer may to some extent reinforce such dependency 73 . China's economic development seems to be at a critical juncture as it faces the danger of dependency. 42 Notwithstanding the many advantages that would push China to overcome its current technological slump and to nurture a knowledge-based economy in the twenty-first century, the creation of new products and services resulting from innovations will be easily accommodated by a large domestic market that has started to be affluent, thus paving the way for even more innovations. However, the market advantage as well as comparative advantage in labour in many years to come could also discourage Chinese firms from attempting innovation. For one thing, combining its strengths in low-cost manufacturing and marketing channels with after-sales service capabilities, China has successfully overcome its weaknesses in quality, which probably gives firms less incentive to do well in the first place. The leverages of its market mean that China will likely continue having access to foreign technology. But only through enhanced technological capacity could China assume a leading position in the world market and enhance the position of domestic firms vis-à-vis those from the advanced industrialised nations 74 . 43 China's technological capability in industry is still weak, which, plus the lack of urgency to pay attention to innovation among Chinese firms, makes an outlook that is not so optimistic. The current technology policy-playing the standards game-in fact signals its weaknesses, as China in the globalisation process has gained little in domestic capabilities. Of course, while it may be tempting to attribute the lack of technological innovation in Chinese enterprises to the bottleneck that inhibits or impedes China's industrial development, technology is a determining factor. If some of China's high-tech enterprises at the very beginning were successful in exploiting and commercialising research results, they now run the risk of becoming so large and bureaucratic that they are unable to continue so being, as has happened before elsewhere 75 . In the name of diversification and joining the "Fortune 500 Club", for example, Legend had expanded its business into system integration and services as well as areas in which the company does where X j is a nation's exports of good j, X wj is world's total exports of good j, X t is a nation's total exports, and X wt is world's total exports. A greater than 2.5 RCA measure demonstrates that a nation has a very strong competitive edge in producing and trading a good, a reading between 1.25 and 2.5 means a strong competitiveness of a nation in a good, and a lower than 0. 
